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ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW RE VIEW

UNITED STATES SECURITIES LAWS:
A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

By JOSEPH JUDE NORTON*

In recent years a dramatic increase has occurred in transnational
business transactions coming within the purview of the United
States federal securities laws. For example, under separate studies
precipitated by the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, the
U.S. Treasury Department concluded that for the year 1975
foreigners invested $86 million in U.S. stocks, corporate securities
and Government securities, and the U.S. Commerce Department
found that foreign direct investment in the U.S. amounted to
26.5 billion at the end of 1974. These studies, however, do not
reflect the number or dollar amount of many transnational business transactions, which to the non-U.S. businessman or attorney
appear at first blush to be purely commercial in nature, but which
under U.S. federal securities laws would be characterized as
securities.
This article shall endeavor to set some perimeters respecting
two fundamental problems concerning the applicability of United
States federal securities laws to foreign business activities: (i)
the extent the term "security" for purposes of federal securities
laws may apply to business transactions and (ii) the extent that
the federal securities laws may extend subject-matter jurisdiction
over activities of foreign individuals and business entities. In
conclusion, a brief discussion will be made of the main registration
exemptions and civil liabilities under the federal securities laws. 1

*LL.B. (Edin.), LL.M. (Texas), SJ.D. (Michigan), Diplome (droit prive) (Hague); Attorney, Dallas, Texas; Lecturer, Southern Methodist University Law School
1.

For purposes of this study, the following major works will be cited as follows:

Bureau of National Affairs, Securities Regulation and Law Report, a weekly
(i)
synopsis of major legal and accounting developments in securities law, hereinafter
BNA Sec.Reg. & L. Rep..
Commerce Clearing House, Inc., Federal Securities Law Reporter, hereinafter
(ii)
CCHFed.Sec.L.Rep..
(iii) Jennings and Marsh, Securities Regulation (1972, as supplemented), hereinafter Jenningsand Marsh.
(iv)
Loss, Securities Regulation, - 6 volumes (1961 as supplemented), hereinafter
Loss.
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I.

Introduction
Historical Perspective. Federal securities laws have primarily
evolved around six federal statutes, the most significant of which
for present purposes are the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act")
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 2
From the vantage point of the non-American, it is perhaps
striking that the first piece of federal securities legislation did
not gestate until 1933, following closely upon the heels of the
dramatic 1929 stock market crash. The United Kingdom, France
and Germany already had embodied in their corporation codes
provisions pertaining to disclosure in securities transactions. In
fact, securities legislation had existed in most of the states of the
United States prior to enactment of the 1933 Act; such state
legislation is commonly dubbed "blue sky laws." '
A notable characteristic of the federal securities laws is that
they are not, unlike their European counterparts, incorporated
within any general corporation code, but stand distinct and apart
from the development of the general body of corporation laws.
This dichotomy is due largely to the fact that there does not
exist in the United States a federal corporation code, although the
argument for the creation of such a code has been long and persistent. ' Also on a state level, the unitary nature of the United
States capital and securities markets has effectively precluded a
piecemeal incorporation of securities provisions within the respective states' corporations codes; such an attempt would clearly
be a futile endeavor. Yet, while developing apart from classical
corporation laws in the United States, federal securities laws
over the years have in reality created its own body of "federal
corporation laws", having a direct and immediate impact upon
corporate behavior and decision-making.
2.
See generally (i) Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. ss.77a-77aa (1970) (hereinafter the "1933 Act"); (ii) Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. ss.7a to 78hh-l
1970 (hereinafter "1934 Act"); (iii) Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
5 U.S.C. ss.79 to 79z-6 (1970); (iv) Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. ss.77aaa77bbbb (1970); (v) Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. ss.80a-1 to 80a-52
(1970); and (vi) Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. ss.80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
The rules under these acts may be found in Title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations (hereinafter "C.F.R.") with the designation of the rule appearing after a prefix
applicable to the pertinent act. The prefixes are 230 for the 1933 Act; 240 for the
1934 Act;and 275 for the 1940 Act.
3.
See Conard, "Overview of the Laws of Corporations", 71 Mich. L. Rev.621,
at 658-660 (1973). For particular comparison of U.S. and U.K. practice see Knauss,
"Securities Regulation in the United Kingdom: A Comparison with United States
Practice", 5 Vand. I. Trans.L. 47 (1971). Also see generally Leleux, "Corporation
Law in the United States and the E.E.C.", 5 Comm. Market L. Rev. 133 (1967). On
U.S. state "blue sky" laws see generally Loss and Cowett, Blue Sky Law (1958).
4.
For recent discussion see especially Cary, "Federalism and corporate law: reflections upon Delaware", 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974) and Jennings, "Federalization
of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the Way", 31 Bus. Lawyer 991 (1976).
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The Acts. The 1933 Act is essentially event oriented; that is,
it is designed to achieve truth in securities in connexion with a
"public distribution" of securities (generally as evidenced by a
formal public offering process) by providing full and fair disclosure to the investing public. The basic dictate of the 1933
Act (as embraced in s.5 thereof) is that every offer of sale or
sale of a security must meet the formal regislation requirements
of the Act, unless an exemption can be found. As will be discussed
subsequently in s.V, an unregistered distribution of securities
which does not meet a statutory exemption may trigger various
sanctions and liabilities. Moreover, even if a distribution is registered or can claim a statutory exemption, this fact will not preclude the applicability of certain broad anti-fraud provisions of
the federal securities laws (given that there exists an underlying
security).
The 1934 Act is geared to multi-faceted aspects concerning
the trading in securities subsequent to an initial distribution.
This Act covers such matters as regulations of stock exchanges
(s.6 of the Act), over-the-counter markets (s.5), broker-dealers
ss.7-11), on-going registration and disclosure requirements respecting certain corporate securities (ss.12(g), 13 and 15(d)),
proxy solicitations (s.14) and security tradings by corporate
"insiders" (s.16). In addition, the 1934 Act established the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the federal administrative agency having primary responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the federal securities laws.
Continuous and Coordinated Disclosure System. The thread
that runs throughout the 1'933 and 1934 Acts is the concept of
"disclosure". The statutory objective of the Acts is not to make
determinations into the merits or non-merits of a particular investment security, but is to provide information to the public investors so that they may make informed investment decisions and
to insure that the integrity of the securities market is maintained.
The material facts about securities having been told, the decision is
then left to the investor.
The 1933 Act disclosure provisions attempt to provide, through
the use of the registration statement and prospectus, all material
information to the investor with respect to the initial distribution
of a security. The 1934 Act has evolved over the years to provide
material disclosure to the public investor subsequent to the public
offering and to the trading markets themselves. Recent emphasis
in federal securities laws is, however, to stress a coordinated
system of disclosure between the 1933 and 1934 Acts, with the
continuous reporting requirements of the 1934 Act becoming the
primary tool in insuring full and fair disclosure to the investor and
the trading markets.
Section 12 of the 1934 Act contains the primary disclosure re-
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quirement, by corporations with assets of over $ 1,000,000 and
having a class of equity securities held by 500 or more stockholders must formally register such equity securities with the SEC
and provide the public with continuous disclosure. While technically it is corporate securities that are registered, in reality it is the
corporation itself which must comply with the periodic filing and
reporting requirements of the 1934 Act, the most notable of
which are the filing of annual reports with certified financial statements on Form 10-Q, and reports of current developments on a
timely basis on Form 8-K.
While the federal securities laws do not purport to be regulatory
in nature, the expansion of the disclosure system has had a definite regulatory effect upon the day-to-day activities of corporations
coming within the ambit of the federal securities legislation. The
SEC continues to evaluate the impact and viability of the use of
a coordinated and continuous disclosure system in protecting the
investing public and the integrity of trading markets, and has
recently completed a comprehensive study of this system. 5
II.
Recognizing A Security
The determination of whether or not a given business transaction involves a "security" is crucial. A basic rule of federal securities law is that every offer to sell or sale of a security must meet
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act, unless a specific
exemption can be proven. Moreover, even where an exemption can
be shown, this is merely an exemption from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act and not from the broad anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.
(A) Respective Definitions
Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act defines a security as follows:
"SECTION 2. When used in this title, unless the context
otherwise requires-(1)
The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock,
bond, debenture, evidence of in-debtedness, certificate of interest or
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, votingtrust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security, or any cer-

tificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing." (Emphasis added.)
5.
Generally on disclosure system see SEC, Disclosure to Investors: A Reappraisal
of Federal Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts: The Wheat Report
(1969) and Report of SEC Advisory Committee on CorporateDisclosure (1977).
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This definition roughly parallels and has generally been equated
with the definition of a security contained in s.3(a) (10) of the
1934 Act.
These corresponding definitions embrace traditional forms of
securities (e.g., stocks, bonds, debentures and warrants); however,
they also contain such expansive terms as "investment contract"
or "any instrument commonly known as a security", which terms
have often been used interchangeably by the courts to embrace
a sundry array of business activities. It is from an examination of
these latter two species of a "security" (which have embraced
such transactions as certain franchise agreements, interests in
certain agricultural ventures, multi-level distributorships, whiskey
warehouse receipts, variable annuity plans and various real estate
arrangements, etc.) that a foreign observer can begin to appreciate
the broad substantive scope of the federal securities laws.
(B) HistoricalPerspective of "Investment Contract"
Congressional desire to include such catch-all phrases as 'investment contract" or "any instrument commonly known as a 'security' " under the statutory definition of a security, appears to
have been designed to provide a broad framework within which
the courts may establish flexible standards and criteria so as to
insure that ingenious schemes which are virtually identical to the
more traditional forms of securities transactions, but are called by
some other name, do not escape the remedial embrace of the federal securities laws.
The historical roots of the term "investment contract" stem
from the 1917 Minnesota legislature's incorporation of this term
in a statute defining "investment company" and "dealer". The use
of the term steadily spread throughout the various state "blue
sky laws" and was ultimately adopted by Congress when it enacted the federal securities laws.
On a purely literal analysis, the words "investment" and "contract" would make it appear that any contractual arrangement
whereby capital was employed to produce some economic benefit
could be found by the courts to constitute a security. As seen in
the early state cases which grappled with the term "investment
contract", the courts had considerable problems in setting some
boundaries to the term. But, very early judicial interpretations
indicate that, despite the broadness of the term, not every investment is a security. 6
6.
On "investment contract" see generally Symposium, "Interpreting the Statutory Definition of a Security, Some Pragmatic Considerations", 6 St. Mary L.J. 96205 (1974); Hannon and Thomas, "The Importance of Economic Realty and Risk
in Defining Federal Securities", 25 Hastings L. Rev. 219 (1973); Tew & Freedman,
"In Support of SEC v. Howey Co.: A Critical Analysis of the Parameters of the Economic Relationship between an Issuer and the Securities Purchaser", 27 U. Miami L. Rev.
407 (1973); Long "An Attempt to Return 'Investment Contract' to the Mainstream
of Securities Regulation", 24 Okla.L.Rev. 135 (1971); and Coffey, "The Economic
Realty of a 'Security': Is there a More Meaningful Formula?" 18 W.Res.L.Rev. 367
(1967).
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(C) The Howey Case
In 1943, the United States Supreme Court, in SEC v. G.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp. (320 U.S. 344) issued its first opinion interpreting the term "Investment contract." This case centered
around a promotional scheme to sell to the public oil leases,
accompanied by representations that defendants would drill a
test well which would prove the productivity of the vendee's
acreage. The purchasers resided throughout the country, many
at a considerable distance from the promised test well-site. There
was no indication that any of the purchasers were capable of
realizing a profit on their purchase through their own skills.
In defining the term "investment contract", the Court chose
to rest its holding on general policy grounds, suggesting a caseby-case analysis:
"The test rather is what character the instrument is given in commerce
by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic
inducements held out to be the prospect. In the enforcement of an act

such as this it is not inappropriate that promoters' offerings be judged as
being what they were represented to be." (Emphasis added.) 320 U.S.
344, at 352, 353.
In Joiner the Court found the economic realities of the situation

indicative of a security as the "trading in these documents had all
the evils inherent in the securities transactions which it was the
aim of the Securities Act to end."
Three years later the Supreme Court, in the 1946 case of

SEC' v. W.J. Howey Co. (328 U.S. 293), specified the distinctive
elements of an "investment contract". In Howey, defendants

owned large tracts ot citrus acreage in Lake Country, Florida.
Defendants offered to the public both a land sales contract and a
service contract and informed potential buyers that an investment
in a small citrus grove was not economically feasible unless service
arrangements were also made. The average size of the tracts sold
to the public was 1.33 acres, and parcels as small as 0.65 of an

acre were conveyed. Although the purchaser, upon full payment,
received a warranty deed to his small tract, the service contract
conveyed a leasehold interest back to defendants. Defendants
were given complete discretion and authority over cultivation,

harvesting and marketing. The landowner did not even have the
right to enter upon his premises. There was no right to specific
fruit (all the produce was pooled), and the defendants disbursed
a share of the net profits to the landowner in accordance with
output from the individual parcels.
As in Joiner, it was impractical in the Howey situation for the
purchasers to participate in development of their own land because of their lack of sophisitication, absenteeism and the economic difficulties of piecemeal working of the land. Relying heavily
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upon prior blue sky laws, a Minnesota Supreme Court decision,
and the statutory aims of the 1933 Act,Justice Murphy inHowey
set forth the following formula:
"[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means

a contract, transaction or scheme whereby [ (1) ] a person invests
his money [ (2) 1 in a common enterprise and [ (3) ] is led to expect
profits [ (4) ] solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party,
it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced
by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets
employed in the enterprise." 328 U.S. 293 at 298.
Justice Murphy was particular in noting that the above test "necessarily underlies this Court's decision in SEC v. Joiner Corp.
thus disclaiming the formulation of a new test.
(D) Summary of Four-ProngedHowey Test
In summary, the Howey "investment contract" test requires
four elements: (1) the investment of money, (2) in a common
enterprise, (3) with the expectation of profits, (4) solely from the
efforts of others.
(1) The investment of money. An investment contract must
be more than simply a payment of money, for it is more than just
a commercial transaction. It involves the transfer of money to an
enterprise with the understanding that the money will be used to
promote the business of that enterprise and with the further understanding that the money will be used to promote the business of
that enterprise and with the further understanding that the invested
fund will be tied to the destiny of the enterprise. Thus, an investment contract can exist only when money is placed at the risk of
an enterprise (i.e., "invested"), perhaps the single most important
characteristic which distinguishes a security from the host of other
business transactions.
A second significant point is that of the use of the word
"money": Does "money" mean actual cash or "money's worth"?
The soundest line of argument is to the effect that "money" is
synonymous with "money's worth."
(2) Presence of a common enterprise. Another indispensable element of the Howey test is the requirement of "common
enterprise." This term is not precisely defined, and has posed considerable problems for the courts over the years. However, the
meaning of the phrase "common enterprise" can be drawn from
looking at the facts of the Supreme Court cases which have dealt
with the term. From each of these cases, it is evident that, at
minimum, the Court will require the presence of a group of investors linked together by a common business scheme in order to
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find the existence of the element of common enterprise. The commonality must be horizontal and not simply vertical between purchaser and seller [Cf., however, Bonnet, "How Common is a Common Enterprise," (1974) Ariz.St.L.J. 3391.
(3) Expectation of profits. It is evident under the Howey
test that there must be an expectation of appreciation above and
beyond the initial value given. For example, in the Joiner case, the
profit expected by each individual investor was the appreciation of
the market price of his individual acreage. In addition, as suggested
by the Supreme Court in both Howey and subsequently in the
1975 case of United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837 (see infra), this expectation of profit must be the primary, if not sole, motivating force behind the investment.
(4)
Profits will result "solely from the efforts of others."
As discussed below, with respect to the Glenn Turner case, the
Ninth Circuit applied a "managerial profits test" in attempting to
characterize the economic realities of the pyramid sales scheme involved in that case. The Ninth Circuit's alternative approach to
the fourth Howey criteria was acknowledged by the Supreme
Court in Forman, though the Supreme Court expressed no view
on the correctness of this approach.
The inference of the Supreme Court appears, however, to be
that the "solely from the efforts of others" test should not be
interpreted literally to the point of frustrating the overall attempts
of the courts to ascertain the true economic reality of the situation. Perhaps one reason the Supreme Court did not take a firm
position is that "the essential managerial efforts test" itself poses
many difficult conceptual and practical problems. For example,
whose and what efforts are in fact essential in terms of the success
or failure of a business scheme? Is the term "essential" to be equated
with "controlling" or is it something else?
(5) Other relevant considerations. At minimum, the seller's
characterization of the scheme is evidentiary in showing whether a
security exists. Moreover, the Court in Forman appears to focus
upon economic inducements made by the seller, along with the
motives of the purchaser.
(E) Post Howey Interpretations.
The Howey test has been the subject of considerable discussion
and criticism over the years. The California Supreme Court in
Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906 (1961) went
so far as to raise the possibility that an emphasis on profit reliance,
as in Howey, misses the mark in ascertaining the existence of an
"investment contract", and to postulate the so-called "risk cap-
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ital" test as an alternative approach to the profit-making requirement set forth in Howey. The court found a strict interpretation
of the Howey test to be nonexclusive, and looked for a test
which would protect the investing public in those situations
where the "profit seeking" motive was not primary. Stated simply,
the "risk capital" test asks: is substantial venture capital being
supplied by an investor who has little or no control over the
venture? This test is not designed to do away with the Howey
criterion of a profit-making motive, but sets forth an additional
test by which the courts may judge novel promotional schemes
for distributing securities to the investing public by focusing on
the actual "risk" of the investment. Certain federal courts have
looked favorably upon use of this test [e.g., Great Western Bank
& Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir., 1976)].
In the 1973 Ninth Circuit decision in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F. 2d 476, (a case involving an elaborate
promotional pyramid sales plan) the court stated that the "solely
from the efforts of others" test in Howey can "lead to unrealistic
results" if applied dogmatically. The Turner case did not attempt
to give a complete and universal definition to "investment contract"; nor did it purport to reject the Howey test. Relying on the
remedial nature of the federal securities statutes, public policy
considerations and the Supreme Court's warning that flexibility
be accorded the definition of a security, the Ninth Circuit promulgated what it considered a realistic test of defining the "efforts"
test of Howey as "whether the efforts made by those other than
the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of an enterprise." The facts in Turner indicated that there was an investment in money by public investors in a common enterprise with
expectations of profit. Moreover, as noted by the trial court's
findings, which apparently were fully supported by the record,
defendants' scheme was a gigantic and successful fraud.
(F)

Howey Remains Law; Forman Case.
Despite whatever judicial interpretations of Howey there have
been, the Howey test remains the primary test for determining
the existence of an "investment contract". Subsequent to Howey,
the Supreme Court on four separate occasions has considered and
defined "investment contract" in light of the four-pronged Howey
test. Partizularly noteworthy is the Supreme Court's most recent
decision in 1975 United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman
(421 U.S. 837).
7.
In addition to Forman case cited in text, see SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins.
Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959) re variable annuity contracts; SECv. United Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967) re "flexible fund" annuities; and Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) re withdrawable capital bank shares.
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In the Forman case, the Supreme Court again espoused the
Howey test as the guiding principal in ascertaining the presence of
an "investment contract". In Forman the Court held that shares

of "stock" entitling a purchaser to lease an apartment in a cooperative housing project financed and supervised by the state
were not securities within the meanings of the 1933 and 1934
Acts. Relying on the fact that the sales in question could not be
held for profits, the district court had ruled that the shares were
not securities and dismissed the complaint. However, the Second
Circuit reversed and held the "stock" to be securities by their
literal designation and because the transaction involved an "investment contract". The Second Circuit did not use the Howey
test as its guide and the Second Circuit found that while the
shares could not be held for monetary profit, there was an expectation of profits from other sources (e.g., rental reductions
resulting from income produced by rental of commercial facilities on the premises).
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, emphasizing
that
"This test, in shorthand form, embodies the essential attributes that
run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security.
The touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture
premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the
entreprenurial or managerial efforts of others. By profits, the Court
has meant either capital appreciation resulting from the development of
the initial investment, . . . or a participation in earnings resulting from
the use of investors' funds, . . . In such cases the investor is 'attracted
solely by the prospects of a return' on his investment." 421 U.S. 837
at 852.

The Supreme Court in Forman rejected the Second Circuit's broad interpretation of profits as being equated with any
economic benefit. Instead, the Court held that profits are to be
construed in the sense of capital appreciation resulting from the
development of the initial investment or a share on earnings and
profits. Further, in analyzing the concept of expectation of
profits, Mr. Justice Powell was particularly concerned with the
economic inducements made to the investors and to the motives
of the purchasers themselves. Reasonable inference from the
decision is that the expectation of profits must be primary,
if not the sole, motivating factor for the investors.
(G) Comment: Commercial v. Investment Approach
An interesting approach has been developed by certain courts in
determining the existence of a "security" by characterizing the
given transaction as either primarily commercial (i.e., not a security) or investment (i.e., a security) in nature. This commercialinvestment test has been applied to date mainly with respect to
the issuance of notes.

ANGLO-AMERICAN LA W RE VIEW
The term "security" under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts explicitly includes within its definition "any note or any participation
in a note." The crucial question therefore revolves around whether
the underlying note constitutes a security. In recent years there
has been considerable controversy as to what notes are in fact
securities. The prevailing view appears to be that a note should be
viewed in context of the entire economic reality of the transaction:
that is, whether the note is primarily "commercial" or "investment" in nature. 8 Not every note, even if literally within the definition of the securities laws, is a security. The commercial context of the underlying transaction has to be evaluated. Notes issued
for personal loans and consumer instalment purposes are not securities. Notes that are issued for investment and business acquisitions, as well as commercial paper sold outside the normal institutional markets, may be securities.
The courts appear to be placing a continuing reliance upon this
so-called "investment-commercial" test, 9 and it is likely the
courts may be looking to this distinction with respect to other
business activities which may involve a security. However, the
Second Circuit has recently concluded that "the best alternative
now available may be in greater recourse to the statutory language"
of the securities laws, wherein a defined transaction is to be
deemed a security "unless the context otherwise requires." This
latter phrase qualifies the definition of a "security" contained in
both the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 10
(H) Example of Scope: Real Estate Transactions:
As indicated above, the federal securities laws have been applied
to a wide variety of business activities not normally preceived as
involving a security. One such area of activity is real estate transactions, which traditionally have been viewed as commercial in
nature. This area is particularly germane to this study, because of
the increasing number of foreign investors participating in real
estate transactions in the United States.
Perhaps the most common form of real estate syndication in
the United States is that of a limited partnership, which by its
very nature is a passive equity-type investment with sole reliance
upon the efforts of a third party (the general partner) for the
management and control of the investment property. As such,
limited partnership interests will generally meet with a strict application of the Howey test. [See SEC Final Guidelines for Disclosure
8.
Cf. however, Lehigh Valley Trust case, 409 F. 2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969).
9.
See inter alia, Andrews v. Blue, 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973); Kerbs v. Fall
River Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir., 1974); and Zabriskie v. Lewis, CCH
Fed.Sec.L.Rep. No.94,902 (1974); and Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1251 (9th Cir., 1976).
10.
See Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., CCH Fed.Sec.
L.Rep. No.95,614 (2nd Cir.,June 9, 1976).
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In the Preparation of Registration Statement§ Relating to Interest
in Real Estate Limited Partnerships, SEC Release 33-5465, March 1,
1974.] Moreover, while an interest in a joint venture or general
partnership is normally the anthesis of an "investment contract,"
it is possible to use the joint venture vehicle to disguise what essentially is a passive investment. For example, if the joint venture interests are offered to a large number of individuals, it is unlikely
that all of the joint ventures can be expected to participate in the
management and control of the project. In securities cases, the
courts have consistently looked to substance over form taking a
liberal approach toward the remedial nature of the federal securities laws.
Another example of where a real estate transaction may involve
a security is with respect to offers and sales of condominiums. As
a general rule condominiums held as investments are not considered a security; however condominiums, coupled with various
collateral service arrangements (e.g., rental pooling), may be deemed
to be securities if they are offered and sold through advertising,
sales literature, promotional schemes or oral representations which
emphasize the economic benefits to the purchaser to be derived
from the managerial efforts of the promoter, or third party designated or arranged for by the promoter in performing such services. [See generally SEC Release 33-5347, January 4, 1973,
although it should be noted the SEC has recently ordered a halt
on No Action Letters involving resort real estate interests].
A security is normally not involved when a person invests in
real estate with the hope of earning profits as a result of a general
increase in values concurrent with the development of the neighborhood, as along as he does not do so as part of an enterprise
whereby it is expressly or impliedly understood that the property
will be developed or operated by others. As such offerings of
undivided interests in real estate will not normally create a security, unless coupled with some form of collateral arrangement
whereby the promoter or nominee as lessee assumes primary responsibility of physical management of the property and distribution of the profits to the co-owners (see I Loss 494).
Additional areas of real estate activity wherein a security may
be involved is with respect to marketing of mortgage notes and
deeds of trust and certain sale and leaseback transactions. Interests
in mortgages and deeds of trust qualify by definition of securities
inasmuch as they would be "evidences of indebtedness" Ordinarily, however in the case of the initial issue of a mortgage note by
buyer to seller, the transaction would be exempt from registration
as it would not involve a public offering. However, as early as
1958 the SEC had expressed concern over the increasing number
of hold trust deeds and mortgages which were being offered for
sale under circumstances indicating that they involved "investment
contracts" which should be registered. Respecting sale or lease-
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back arrangements, these would generally not constitute an
"investment contract", insofar as the buyer does not look to the
continuing management efforts of the seller for return of profit.
However, several recent SEC No Action Letters suggest that under
certain circumstances an "investment contract" may be involved.
As a general guide in determining whether a real estate transaction (or for that matter any other business transaction) involves
an investment contract (ergo a "security") the cases indicate that
form will give way to substance and economic reality. To rely on a
strict and enforceable interpretation of Howey would appear
injudicious, even in light of the recent Forman case. In any event
if there appears to be even a tinge of a passive investment element
in a real estate transaction, the question should be raised for
further analysis as to whether a security is involved.' 1
III
Extraterritorial Applicability
Knowing the substantive content of U.S. securities laws is one
matter, knowing the embrace of such laws in jurisdictional terms
is another. To many foreign observers, the broad approach taken
extension of
by U.S. courts with respect to the extraterritorial
12
the federal securities laws is most disturbing.
A threshold consideration respecting extraterritorial application
of the Federal Securities laws is the limitations, if any, placed
upon such application by requirements of international law. With
such international perimeters in mind, consideration will then be
made of (i) the statutory bases of extraterritorial application and
(ii) selective cases on the question decided by United States courts.
Regarding the first question, it is clear that professionals, including broker/dealers and banks are persons who "transact business in securities." In Ferraioli [CCH FedSecL.Rep. No.91615
(1965)], the New York district court extended the scope of
s.30(b) to non-professionals who had entered into a single isolated sale of securities. However, the Second Circuit in Schoenbaum, supra, expressly rejected this broad interpretation of
s.30(b) given by the court in Ferraioli;the Second Circuit limited
the s.30(b) exemption to persons generally engaged in a business
in securities through foreign securities markets and not to persons
See generally Rifkinds & Borton, "SEC Registration of Real Estate", 27 Business
11.
Lawyer 649 (1972); Wertheimer & Mark, "Special Problems of Unregistered Real Estate
Securities", 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1191 (1975), and comment; "Securities Regulation of
Real Estate Programs", 27 Ark.L.Rev. .651 (1973): Also see Burton, Jr. "Real Estate
Syndications in Texas: An Examination of Securities Problems", 51 Texas L. Rev.
239, 244 (1973).
12.
For foreign criticism of U.S. Approach generally see Jennings, "Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws", XXXIII Brit. Yb Intl L. 146 (1957)
and Mann, "Anglo-American Conflict of International Jurisdiction", 13 Intl & Comp.
L.Q. 1460 (1964).
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who engaged in isolated foreign transactions. In fact, in Schoenbaum the court went so far as to hint that the exemption should
be limited to securities transactions effected on foreign exchanges
- a view with no apparent statutory basis.
(A) Limitations Under InternationalLaw.
General Principles. The fact that valid international law is part
of U.S. municipal law is established. The problems that American
courts have had in this respect, particularly in the area of jurisdiction, stem primarily from the difficulties in determining exactly
what may or may not be international law on a given point.
Traditionally, the United States has primarily relied upon the
territorial principle of jurisdiction for applying U.S. laws to situations involving a foreign element. However, over the years the territorial principle itself has been expanded in several ways. The socalled subjective territorial principal (as encapsulated in No.17
of the Restatement of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations of the
United States), has been developed to establish the jurisdiction of
a state to an act commenced within the state, but completed
abroad. The objective territorial principle (as delineated in No.18
of the Restatement would confer jurisdiction to a state respecting
an act commenced without the state but consummated, or having
an impact within its territory.
While an assertion of jurisdiction under the objective territorial
principle purports to be "territorial," in fact it is not, as nothing
need necessarily be done in the territory. Use of the objective
territorial principle has, however, been traditionally subject to
limitations imposed by United States courts. First, the conduct
and its effect must be "consistuent elements of activities to which
the rule applies." The second test is that the effect within the territory must be "substantial." Thirdly, the territorial effect must
''occur as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct abroad."
Finally, the rule of law of which the territorial state seeks to impose on conduct abroad causing effects in the territory must not
be "inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by the states that have reasonably developed legal systems."
Such criteria are admittedly somewhat vague and nebulous. However, they do express the principle that there are limitations upon
the extraterritorial applicability of domestic law.
The underpinnings of U.S. law respecting extraterritorial jurisdiction are found in the caselaw involving extension of jursidiction
under the federal antitrust laws. 13 It is from the perspective of
this caselaw, that the courts have embarked upon their analysis
of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the federal securities laws. While
See Inter alia U.S. v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945);
13.
and U.S. v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Informatkon Center, Inc., 1963 CCH Trade
Cases No.70,600 at 77,414, 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See Report of the Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, at 76-77 (March 31, 1955),
and Fulda & Schwarts, Regulation of International Trade &Investment Ch. 2 (1970).
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subject to considerable international criticism, these underpinnings
can find their counterparts in various foreign jurisdiction. 14
(B)

Statutory Bases.
1934 Act. Traditionally, the 1934 Act had been thought to apply only to transactions within the territorial limits of the United
States. This normal presumption of territoriality was viewed as reenforced by the specific mandate of s.3)(b) of the 1934 Act. However, in recent years, the Second Circuit, beginning with the
Schoenbaum case [405 F.2d 200 (1968)], has stood this traditional view on its head through a somewhat contrived rationalization (see infra.). In addition, until 1964, most of the provisions of the 1934 Act extended only to securities listed on a
national securities exchange or, to a limited extent, to securities for which a registration statement had been filed under the
1933 Act. However, in 1964, s.12(g) was added to the 1934 Act
which essentially requires all corporations (i) engaged in interstate commerce, or in a business affecting interstate commerce, or
whose securities are traded by use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce and (ii) which have total
assets exceeding 1,000,000 dollars, to register each class of equity
security held of record by 500 or more persons.
Thus, from a strict statutory focus, ss.30(b) and 12(g) are of
primary concern in understanding the extraterritorial effects of
the 1934 Act:
(1)
Section 30(b). Section 30(b) of the 1934 Act provides
that the provisions of the Act or any rule or regulation thereunder shall not be applicable "to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United
States, unless he transacts such business in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of this title." In examining
this provision two basic questions arise: (a) who is encompassed
by the clause "any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities," and (b) what are the jurisdictional limits of s.30(b).
What exactly "jurisdiction" means for purposes of s.30(b) is
unclear. The courts infer that it is something more than territorial
competence; yet logically and legally it makes no sense to view it
as full jurisdiction in an international law sense, for then Congress
would be granting authority beyond its own limits of power.
Whether or not the phrase "without the jurisdiction of the United
States" is to be viewed in terms of territorial limitation or more in
14.
For example of foreign counterparts see Inter alia Allen, "The Development
of EEC Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Alien Undertakings", 2 Legal Issues of European
Integration 35 (1974).
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terms of jurisdiction in the public internation law sense is still an
unsettled question. 1 5
(2) Section 12(g). Unlike s.30(b) of the 1934 Act which requires positive action by the SEC if the Act is to be applied to
persons transacting a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, s.12(g) requires all corporations having
securities coming within the terms of such section to register each
class of equity securities held by more than 500 holders of record
unless the SEC chooses to take affirmative action to exempt a
foreign issuer. Section 12(g) is accordingly given a presumptively
extraterritorial application by Congress, to be modified only by
the SEC.
Effective May 31, 1967, SEC Rule 12g 3 -2 was adopted. (SEC
Release No.34-8066.) This detailed regulation requires all foreign
issuers of a class of securities held by 300 or more United States
residents to comply either with s.12(g) or some substitute registration requirement. Issuers with more than half their outstanding
voting securities held directly or indirectly by United States residents, and whose businesses are either "administered primarily in
the United States" or controlled by a board of directors, at least
half of whom reside therein, must, with minor exceptions, comply
fully with s.12(g). Almost all other private issuers have the choice
of complying with s.12(g) or the more liberal requirements of the
first clause of para. (b) of the regulation which requires filing with
the SEC of that information required to be made public by (i)
the law of the country of its domicile or in which it is incorporated or organized, (ii) the stock exchange on which its securities are traded and which were made public by such exchange,
or (iii) that information distributed to its security holders. Formal
registration of a foreign corporation under s.12(g) will result in the
proxy provisions of the Act being applicable to any securities so
registered and the short-term trading provisions of s.16(b) being
applicable to 10% holders of such securities, although compliance
does not constitute an admission that the foreign issuer is subject
to the provisions of the 1934 Act.
1933 Act. The registration requirements of the 1933 Act generally apply to an offer or sale of a security involving interstate commerce or the use of the mails unless a specific exemption is found.
As defined by s. 2(7) of the 1933 Act, the term "interstate commerce" includes "trade or commerce in securities or any transportational communication related thereto . . . between any
foreign country and any state, territory or the District of Columbia". In this context, the 1933 Act may be construed to encom15.
See generally Goldman & Magrino, "Some Foreign Aspects of Securities Regulation: Toward a Revaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act", 55
Va.L.Rev. 1015 (1969).
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pass virtually any offering of securities made by a United States
corporation to foreign investors.
The SEC has, however, in the past taken the position that the
registration requirements of s. 5 of the Act are primarily intended
to protect American investors. While never admitting lack of jurisdiction, the Commission has not taken any action for failure to
register securities of United States corporations distributed abroad
to foreign nationals, even though use of jurisdictional means may
be involved in the offering. It is, however, assumed in these situations that the distribution is to be effected in a manner which
would result in the securities coming to rest abroad. On the other
hand, a distribution of securities by a United States corporation,
through the facilities of a Canadian stock exchange, may be
expected to flow into the hands of American investors and therefore would be subject to registration. Similarly, a public offering
specifically directed toward American nationals abroad, including
servicemen, would be regarded by the SEC as subject to registration if the interstate commerce jurisdictional provision is met
[SEC Release No. 4708 (1964)] . Apart from such situations, however, it has been generally considered immaterial whether the
otfering originates from within or outside the United States, so
long as the offering is made under circumstances reasonably
designed to preclude distribution or redistribution of the securities
within, or to the nationals or residents of, the United States. However, quite recently the SEC has been encouraging registration,
even under these latter considerations.
(C) Selected Cases.
While it is outside of the scope of this article to deal at any
length with the sundry cases considering the extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws, it may prove helpful briefly to
consider a recent Second Circuit dealing with the subject, along
with the recent Supreme Court decision in Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co.. 16
(1) Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, 519 F.2d 9/4 (2nd Cir. 1975).
This suit, which appears to represent the maturation of the Second
Circuit's (at least Judge Friendly's) thoughts on the matter of
extraterritorial application, eminates as a by-product of the infamous existence of Investors Overseas Services (IOS), with the
added twist of being a class action involving U.S. plaintiffs resident
16.
The Bersch case discussed in the text represents the culmination of a line of
Second Circuit cases, particularly: Schoenbaum v.Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (1968)
and Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (1972). For
additional securities cases involving problems of extraterritorial jurisdiction to those
cited in notes and cited hereinafter, see inter alia Finch v. Marathon Securities Corporation, 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D. N.Y. 1970); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited, 473
F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); S.E.C. v. Kasser. 391 F. Supp. 1167 (NJ., 1975) and Recamon v. Barish, 408 F.Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa.1975); and SEC v. Churchill ForestIndustries
(Manitoba) Ltd., (3rd Cir., decided Nov. 8, 1976, Case No. 76-1322).
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in the. United States, U.S. plaintiffs resident abroad, and non-U.S.
plaintiffs resident abroad.
With respect to United States residents, the Second Circuit was
reluctant to find jurisdiction solely on an alleged adverse impact
on the American economy or American investors generally,
especially in light of requirements of international law. The court
did find subject-matter jurisdiction on the assumption that there
was some mailing of prospectuses in the United States and some
direct reliance upon them. Accordingly, the court endeavoured to
satisfy the "effects" and "direct and foreseeability" requirements
of s. 18 of the Restatement, while finding significant activity
within the United States.
Concerning the United States citizens resident abroad, the
Court conceded, that the federal securities laws were not necessarily designed to protect thousands of Americans residing in
foreign countries against securities frauds by foreigners acting
there. However, the Court found the presence of "preparatory
activities" in the United States, which "significantly" contributed
to the alleged losses, to be sufficient to trigger application of the
jurisdiction of the securities laws when there is alleged injury to
Americans abroad. But, without explanation or distinction, the
court held such "preparatory activities" not to be sufficient by
themselves for jurisdictional purposes with respect to foreigners
abroad. In this respect, the court appears to consider the factor
of nationality to be controlling.
While the Second Circuit requires a greater significance of U.S.
activities respecting injury to foreigners abroad, as distinguished
from American citizens abroad, the court made clear in this case,
as well as in another case decided the same day by the court involving an international securities transaction, that "Congress did
not mean the United States to be used as a base for fraudulent
securities schemes even when the victims are foreigners, at least in
the context of suits by the SEC or by named foreign plaintiffs".
[See Ill v. Vencap, Ltd, 519 F.2d 100 (%nd Cir., 1975).] However, in such instances, the activities within the United States must
be more than merely "preparatory" ones; they must relate to
activities which may themselves be elements of an anti-fraud
violation. As indicated by a recent Third Circuit Court case, the
concept of "preparatory" activity is an elusive one, which may
well be susceptible to "watering down" especially in an SEC injunction action (see Churchill case cited in note 16).
In summarizing the Second Circuit's view on the matter in
Bersch, Judge Friendly postulated the following conclusions, in
that the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
(i)
(ii)

apply to losses of sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts (or culpable failures to act) of
material importance occurred in this country; and
apply to losses from sales of securities to American residents abroad
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(iii)

if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United States have significantly contributed thereto; but
do not apply to losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside
the United States unless acts (or culpable failures to act) within the
United States directly caused such losses. 519 F.2d 974 at 993.

In (i) and (iii) above, it appears the jurisdiction will be extended
along fairly traditional territorial concepts of jurisdiction. However (ii) presents some rather bothersome implications, inasmuch
as it appears to extend jurisdiction on the basis of nationality
alone, which position may, in an international sense, be an excessive or exorbitant application of a state's jurisdiction and may
well vilate certain existing U.S. bilateral treaty commitments.
(2) Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (Supreme
Court, 1973). This case centers around 1934 Act anti-fraud
claims under s.10(b) brought against Scherk, a German national,
by the American corporation, Alberto-Culver (which is a widely
held public corporation, with stock listed on the New York stock
exchange). Alberto-Culver had acquired three foreign enterprises
from the defendant, which involved the issuance of securities (i.e.,
promissory notes) from the acquired assets. The purchase contract, which was negotiated partly in the United States, the United
Kingdom and Germany, executed in Austria, and finally closed in
Switzerland, contained express representations and warrants that
certain trademarks acquired were free and clear of all encumbrances, an asserted fact which was subsequently found to be untrue.
The purchase contract also contained (i) a choice of forum provision providing that any controversies or claims arising thereunder were to be arbitrated before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Paris and (ii) a choice of law provision applying the
state law of Illinois.
After Alberto-Culver discovered that the representations and
warranties respecting the trademarks (which incidentially were
licensed through manufacturers and distributors in the United
States, in addition to those in Europe) were not valid, it tended
the acquired assets back to Scherk and sough recission of the
purchase contract. Scherk, however, refused, and Alberto-Culver
accordingly brought suit in federal district court in Illinois. Scherk
in turn moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of both personal and subject matter jurisdiction. However the district court, and
subsequently the court of appeals, rejected such motion, relying
primarily upon the Supreme Court decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427 (1953), which they felt had held that an arbitration provision as provided for in the instant case would be unenforceable
under the federal securities laws.
However, the Supreme Court took a different view of the facts
and also of the interpretation of its Wilko decision, and held the
arbitration provision to be enforceable. Writing for the majority,
Justice Stewart distinguished Wilko, primarily on the fact that the
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instant case involved a "truly international agreement." The
Court, reply on its earlier decision in Breman v. Zapata Off-shore
Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1972), felt that the interest of international business transactions required that such forum and choice of law provision in the disputed arbitration clause be enforced. In so holding
that such an arbitration provision could lawfully oust the jurisdiction of domestic courts and preclude the extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws, the Court also seemed impressed that in 1970 the United States had acceded to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards.
All of the material facts in Scherk, except for the presence of
the arbitration provision and a relevant international convention, would indicate that the jurisdictional requirements of the
Schoenbaum-Leasco-Bersch line of cases would be satisfied. However, respecting what the Court dubs a "truly international agreement," the presence of suitable choice of forum and choice of
law clauses appear to be sufficient to preclude the extraterritorial
application of the federal securities laws.
While the main thrust of the Court is directed to the upholding
of an international agreement, entered into at arm's length, Scherk
and its implications remain somewhat unsettling. Firstly, there appears to be no determinative criteria as to at what point an agreement is in fact "truly international." Additionally, one cannot
help wonder whether the size and sophistication of a company like
Alberto-Culver, and its apparent ability to fend for itself, influenced the Court's decision. Would the holding in Scherk apply to a
smaller domestic corporation having limited international experience, and would it apply in the situation of a United States individual? Also, Scherk leaves unclear whether or not the Court is
implying that choice of law and conflicts of law rules should take
precedence over general policy considerations of the federal
It should be noted that in writing for the four dissenting members of the Court, Justice Douglas vigorously rejected the majority's dichotomy between domestic and internation agreements.
Justice Douglas left no doubt that he felt subject-matter jurisdiction existed in the instant case in the United States courts. (D) Observations.
From an examination of the cases and relevant statutes referred to above, the following observations may be derived:
(1)
The position of American jurisprudence remains that,
absent specific or implied congressional intent, the presumption is
that federal law applies only within the territorial limits of the
17.
For further discussion of Scherk see inter alia Note: 16 Harv. Int' L.J. 705
(1975). For sharp criticism of case see Comment: "Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. and
Arbitration Under the Securities Exchange Act: A Comity of Errors", 1 J.Comp.L.
100 (1975).
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United States. In the securities law area, this presumption will be
rebutted at least where the interest of protecting American investors and the integrity of the United States securities market predominates.
(2)
In recent cases the courts have primarily focused upon
the subjective territorial principle as a basis for finding subjectmatter jurisdiction arising under federal securities laws, especially
in the area of securities fraud. On the basis of traditional principles
of territorial jurisdiction, as embodied in s.17(a) of the Restatement, the subject provisions of the federal securities laws would be
applicable when the violative transaction occurs entirely or substantially within the territory of the United States, even when the
plaintiff and the only parties injured are predominately foreign.
The difficult cases arise in determining the nature and extent of
domestic activity for triggering provisions of the federal securities
laws where conduct in the United States is minimal. It would appear that such conduct should be significant, essential and necessary in relation to the violative transaction (and not merely incidental or "preparatory" U.S. activity although the material content in the notion of "preparatory" appears rather loose). Clearly,
listing on an American stock exchange would be one connecting
factor, but substantial conduct may well consist of something less.
However, the SEC's position that the use of interstate commerce
facilities by itself is sufficient domestic activity strikes a very nervous note.
(3)
On the basis of Bersch, it appears that the Second Circuit may be willing to extend jurisdiction in instances involving
U.S. citizens abroad, primarily on the basis of nationality. Such an
extension may well be deemed an exhorbitant exercise of jurisdiction under international law.
(4)
Acts not occurring within the United States may come
under subject-matter jurisdiction if such act could have a "significant impact" within the United States with regard to the
American investors, and extraterritorial application is therefore
necessary to protect securities trading in the United States and/or
American investors. Adverse impact alone does not appear to be
sufficient by itself for invoking jurisdiction; there must be additional connecting factors. Moreover, s.18(b) of the Restatement
would indicate that in addition to the significant impact there
must exist a direct casual relationship, with the domestic impact
occurring as a direct and foreseeable result on the conduct abroad.
The courts (except perhaps in Bersch) however, see-i to focus
solely on whether or not a significant impact has occurred. Such a
broadening of the principles of s.18(b) appears to be unsupported
by any principle of international law.
(5)
The courts do not appear ready to permit the United
States to be used as a base for fraudulent securities schemes even
when the victims are foreigners, at least in the context of suits by
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the SEC or by named foreign plaintiffs. The question of the degree
of significance of the U.S. activities appears to remain an open
point.
(6)
The scope of the s.30(b) exemption to the applicability
of the 1934 Act is not entirely clear.
(7)
It is also unclear whether there is a differing standard
for extraterritorial application of the registration provisions of the
1933 Act from that applied in anti-fraud cases, and whether there
are differing standards to be applied in a private damage suit from
an SEC injunctive action.
(8)
It is difficult to formulate any general principles of international law with regard to the extraterritorial application of municipal law. However, international law does appear to set some
outer limits to the extent a domestic jurisdiction can extend its
laws. Section 18(b) of the Restatement would appear to represent
the broadest limits internation law would permit.
(9)
In instances involving "truly international" securities
transactions, the courts appear willing to permit parties in arm's
length dealings to limit contractually the applicability of the federal securities laws. The full implication of the Supreme Court's
decision in Scherk, however, remains unclear.
(10)
The significance of coming under the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the federal securities laws can be far-reaching;
covering such diverse matters as fraud in securities transactions
under Rule lOb-5 and other anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and
1934 Acts, registration requirements under s.5 of the 1933 Act,
reporting requirements under ss.12, 13 and 15 of the 1934 Act,
controls on dispositions of restricted securities, proxy and tender
offer regulations (including reporting of 5% or more ownership of
registered securities), broker-dealer requirements, and rules on
short-swing profits under s.16 of the 1934 Act.

IV.
Note on Exemption From Registration
As indicated above, every offer or sale of a security must meet
the registration requirements of the 1933 Act unless an exemption
can be proven. The most commonly relied upon transactional
exemptions from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act
are: (i) the private placement exemption under s. 4(2) of the 1933
Act or new Rule 146; (ii) the intra-state offering exemption under
s. 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act or new Rule 145;and (iii) the limited
($500,000) offering exemption under s. 3(b) of the 1933 Act and
Regulation A thereunder. It should be noted, however, that all
exemptions under the 1933 Act are merely exemptions from the
registration requirements of that Act and are not exemptions from
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liability or certain reporting requirements under the securities
laws. Moreover, the burden of proof in establishing the existence
of an exemption always rests on the claimant. In addition, because
of the dual system of federal and state securities laws, one must
separately look to the specific requirements of the relevant "blue
sky" laws for exemption from the registration requirements under
state law.
(A) Federal Law - Private Placements.
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act exempts "transactions by an
issuer not involving any public offering" from the registration
requirements of s. 5 of this Act. Basically, this exemption was designed for use by large sophisticated institutional investors (e.g.,
insurance companies) and not for general use. Over the years, the
courts had broadened the category of persons for whom the
exemption is available; however, recently the courts have turned
back toward a more restrictive usuage of the exemption. Moreover, recently the SEC has promulgated Rule 146 respecting
exemption for private offerings (SEC Release 33-5487, April 23,
1974, as amended by Release 33-5585).
(1) Section 4(2) and the statutory exemption. The 1953 U.S.
Supreme Court case of SEC v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119,
remains the leading case respecting criteria used in determining
what constitutes a non-public offering under s. 4(2). First, do the
offerees need the protection which registration affords; and
second, have they access to the kind of information that would be
available in the registration statement? In addition, over the years
a number of criteria have been suggested for what distinguishes a
private from a public offering including, numerical tests respecting
offerings; need for information; access to and quality of information; dollar size of offering; and investment intent of purchasers.
Moreover in a 1972 5th Circuit decision, the court also considered
the necessity of having some form of preexisting relationship
between the issuer and offerees (see SEC v. Continental Tobacco,
463 F. 2d 137).
Despite many pitfalls surrounding the s. 4(2) exemption, many
syndicators continue to rely on this statutory exemption primarily
because of the strigency and technical complexity of Rule 146. If
reliance on the staturory exemption is made, the following elements (by way of summary guildelines) should be considered:
(i)

(ii)

Each person to whom an offer is extended must be sophisticated
enough to evaluate the proposed investment (a difficult and highly

subjective determination);
The sellers must be able to testify under oath as to each offer extended - failure to identify each and every offeree would create the
presumption that there may have been others and destroy the availability of the exemption;

(iii)

All investors must be furnished with the same information which a
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registration statement filed under the Securities Act of 1933 would
make available (another subjective determination);
(iv) The manner of the offering must be such that no means of public
solicitation is involved;
(v)
The number of offerees must be small (although no exact number
has ever been agreed upon);
(vi) It is desirable that there be some preexisting personal or business
relationship between the buyers and sellers, or among the buyers
themselves;
(vii) All investors must purchase for investment only and not with a view
toward resale or further distribution; and
(viii) The sellers must introduce affirmative evidence that no additional
sales were contempated in the future.

(2) Rule 146 (Effective June 10, 1974). Seeking to create
objective standards and eliminate uncertainty to the extent
possible in the area of private placements, the SEC has (after
extensive consideration and debate) adopted Rule 146, Transactions by an Issuer Not Involving Any Public Offering. While the
SEC does not believe it possesses the rule-making power to extend
the availability of the Rule to anyone other than an issuer, the
unofficial SEC staff position is that s.4(2) of the 1933 Act is also
applicable to controlling persons.
Under the Rule (effective with regard to offerings commencing
on or after June 10, 1974), all persons who claim the availability
of the Rule would have the burden to establish that all of its
conditions have been met. Moreover, because of the stringent
requirements of the Rule (particularly regarding the type of
information which must be furnished offerees), it is extremely
difficult for a "non-public" enterprise to meet all of the conditions of the Rule. 8
18.
Briefly, the conditions of the Rule, all of which must be met for the Rule to be
available are:
(i) Numerical Limitation. There can be no more than 35 purchasers in any "offering"
pursuant to the Rule.
(ii)Nature of Offeree. While with regard to numerical limitation' the Rule stresses
purchasers, the main thrust of the Rule is still designed to protect the offerees. The Rule
contains two alternative tests for qualification of offerees: (i) a person would qualify
who by virtue of knowledge and experience in financial and business matters is capable
of utilizing the furnished information required by the Rule in evaluating the economic
risks and in making an informed investment decision;or (ii) a person would also qualify
if he is able to bear the economic risks of the investment and if he relies on a qualified
"offeree representative". The issuer or any person acting on its behalf must have "reasonable grounds" to believe that such qualifications of the offeree are met prior to
making an offer and prior to making a sale.
(iii) Limitation on Manner of Sale - No GeneralAdvertisement. The Rule provides
that neither the issuer nor any person acting on his behalf shall offer or sell the securities
by means of "any form of general advertisement". Such prohibition would include (but
not be limited to) seminars or meetings or letters, circulars, notices, radio or television
broadcasts, which are directed to any non-qualified offeree; however, the prohibition
would not apply to qualified offerees and where the communication is accompanied by
an undertaking to furnish the information required by the Rule.
(iv) Offeree Representative. As defined by the Rule an "offeree representative" is a
person who is not an affiliate (including officers, directors and 1O% shareholders of
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The cornerstones of Rule 146 are (i) full disclosure to investors
and (ii) close control to ensure that no offers are extended except
to qualified investors. If these and certain other conditions are
met, then an unlimited number of offers may be made, and up to
thirty-five (35) sales may be consummated, without federal
securities registration. The Rule contains no numerical limitation
as to offerees, although there exists other criteria for determining
qualified offerees.
It should be noted that Rule 146 would be non-exclusive of the
s.4(2) statutory exemption. The fact that the issuer's transaction
does not meet all the conditions of the Rule would not raise any
presumption that the statutory s.4(2) exemption is not available
for the transaction. However, in light of the recent case law in
the area, a practitioner would be wise to weigh existing private
placement situations in view of the Rule. "Substantial" compliance with Rule 146 may, arguably, be sufficient for proving
up the statutory exemption under s.4(2).
(B) Intrastate Exemption &Rule 147.
Section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act provides an exemption for
intrastate financing with regard to "any security which is part of
an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single
State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person
issuer), associate or employee of the issuer, who has sufficient knowledge and expertise
to evaluate the risks of the prospective offering, and who is acknowledged by the offeree
during the course of the transation to be his representative for the purpose of evaluating
the risks of the investment. The acknowledgement of representation must be made for
each prospective investment and before every sale.
(vi A-cess to Information. There are two basic requirements as to furnishing information- . . ferees: (i) an offeree or his representative must either be in a position to obtain
the same kind of information that registration would provide or actually receive such information; and (ii) the issuer must make the opportunity available to the offeree or his
representative to obtain additional information to verify the basic information furnished.
An issuer subject to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Securities Act may satisfy
the information conditions by providing each offeree with the information contained in
the most recent 10-K Annual Report, Form S-1 or Form 10, in addition to furnishing information as to a description of the securities offered, intended use of proceeds, and any
material adverse changes in the issuer's affairs not disclosed in the forms filed. The issuer
must update this information if the proxy statement or required reports have been filed
with the SEC since the filing of the annual report or registration statement. Non-reporting companies would be required to provide that information called for by the Schedule
A of the Securities Act of 1933, except that where certified financial statements are not
available and cannot be obtained without unreasonable effort or expense, those required
by Regulation A under the 1933 Act may be provided.
(vi) Limitation on Disposition. The issuer or any person acting on his behalf must
take "reasonable care" to assure that the purchasers are not underwriters (i.e.
participating, directly or indirectly, in a public distribution of securities). Such reasonable care
would include, but not necessarily be limited to (i) making reasonable inquiry to determine if purchaser is an underwriter; (ii) placing a legend on securities evidencing that
they are unregistered and setting forth restrictions on transferability and sale; (iii) issuance of stop transfer instructions to transfer agent; and (iv) obtaining a written agreement from purchaser that the securities 'that the securities will not be resold without
registration or an exemption therefrom. In addition, the issuer should take steps to
determine whether the purchasers are to be the beneficial owners of the securities or
whether they are acting for other persons.
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resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or Territory".
This so-called intrastate exemption has in the past been shied
away from by most knowledgeable attorneys and issuers because
of the uncertainity surrounding such notions as '"part of an issue",
"bona fide resident" for all offerees and purchasers, and "doing
business within such state" [SEC Release 334434, (1961)].
Rule 147 has recently been promulgated by the SEC in an
attempt to provide some objective standards for use of the intrastate exemption and to ensure that such exemption is used only
for the purpose that Congress intended it (i.e., local financing of
companies, primarily intrastate in character). Specifically, the
Rule endeavors to set perimeters for the terms "part of an issue",
business within" for purposes of
"preson resident" and "doing
1 9
Act.
1933
the
of
s.3(a)(11)
The stated purposes of the Rule are: (1) to serve the public
interest by protecting investors and providing more certainity in
determining when the exemption provided by s.3(a)(11) is available; (2) to enable local business seeking financing solely from
local sources to determine with more certainty whether they may
use the exemption and the registration provisions of the 1933
Act; and (3) to give more assurance that the exemption is used
only for its intended congressional purpose of local financing of
companies primarily intrastate in character.
While the Rule is stated to be non-exclusive, it is clear that all
thoughtful attorneys will in fact treat it as an exclusive guide for
the intrastate exemption. However, it appears to this writer that
Rule 147 (SEC Release 33-5450, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 2253) covers trans19.
actions involving offers and sales of securities which meet all of the following conditions:
(i) The issuer must be "resident" of the state or territory in which the securities are
offered and sold. To satisfy the residency requirement, a corporation, limited partnership or business trust must be incorporated or organized pursuant to the laws of such
state or territory. A general partnership, not formed under a specific state law, must have
its principal office within the state. In addition, an individual deemed an issuer (e.g.
promoter issuing preincorporation certificates) will be deemed a resident if his principal
residence is in the state or territory.
(ii) The issuer must be doing business within such state or territory. To meet the
"doing business within" condition, the Rule sets out three percentage requirements, all
of which must be met: (a) at least 80% of issuer'sgross
of which must be met: (a) at least 80% of issuer's gross revenues on a consolitated basis

are derived from the state; (b) at least 80% of its assets on a consolidated basis are located within the state; and (c) at least 80% of the proceeds of the offering will be spent in
connection with the issuer's business conducted within the state. In addition, the issuer's
principal office must be located in the state.
(iii) The offerees and purchasers must be resident within such state. To meet this
requirement a person must have his "principal" residence in such state.
(iv) Resales for a period of nine months after the last sale which is part of issue must
be limited so as the securitieswill come to rest within the state. In this regard, the issuer
will be required to take affirmative measures such as (a) placing a legend on the certificate, (b) issuing stop transfer instructions; and (c) obtaining oral representations from all
purchasers as to their residence. In addition the issuer must disclose in writing these
limitations on resale. The thrust of this requirement is to provide objective standards for
determining when an issue "comes to rest".
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the new Rule in fact represents an even more restrictive and
narrow view of the intrastate offering exemption than the already
restrictive and narrow judicial and administrative interpretations
of the exemption that existed prior to its adoption.
(C) The Regulation A Offering.
Pursuant to statutory authority to exempt certain small public
offerings, the SEC has promulgated "Regulation A" which
exempts from registration public offerings for the account of a
company which do not exceed $500,000 in the aggregate in any
one year. If the securities are to be sold for the account of a
holder other than the company, the aggregate offering price during
any one year may not exceed $100,000. Although Regulation A
is technically an exemption from the registration requirements,
considerable documentation is necessary to establish the exemption, and a Regulation A is sometimes referred to as a "mini"
registration. An offering circular, which is similar to a prospectus,
must be supplied to each purchaser except for Regulation A
offerings not exceeding $50,000 and filed with the regional SEC
office.
The principal advantages of Regulation A offerings, as opposed
to tull registration, are that the required financial statements are
simpler and need not be certified, and overall expenses are usually
less. Regulation A offerings are reviewed by the regional offices
of the SEC and not by the Division of Corporation Finance in
Washington, D.C., as are full registrations. In some cases Regulation A offerings have the advantage of being processed more
quickly than full registrations, depending on the regional office
and the time of year. There is, however, some prejudice in the
financial community against Regulation A offerings. Some reputable underwriters who participate in small intrastate issues will
refuse to take part in Regulation A offerings and prefer full S-1
registrations even for offerings which would qualify under Regulation A.
The SEC is presently considering "upping" the dollar restrictions on the use of the Regulation A offering.
(D) Problems of Integration.
As a general rule, if a specific exemption from '33 Act registration is relied upon, the exemption will be lost if the offering
is deemed to be part of a larger distribution of securities that
does not qualify for the same exemptions. For example, an issuer
cannot avail himself of two separate exemption (e.g., intrastate
and private placement exemptions) for what is essentially one
scheme of distribution merely .because the entire distribution
would not qualify entirely for either one exemption. The SEC
will only permit use of two separate exemptions when one might
be sufficient where there is strong business justification for split-
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ting an issue of securities [SEC Release 33-2029 (1939)].
The problem of integration is a highly conceptual problem and
hinges upon whether or not apparently separate securities transactions in fact constitute one common scheme of distribution.
Factual elements which may be helpful in defeating an attempt to
integrate are (i) whether offerings are made at different times;
(ii) whether the projects are financially independent from each
other; or (iii) whether or not the risks and success of each transaction are dependent on the fate of the other project. In essence,
to have integration the facts must indicate a common scheme of
distribution.
V.
Note on Civil Liabilities
(A) 1933 Act.
An offering that does not meet a statutory exemption and is
not registered may trigger several sanctions:
(i) One danger is that the SEC may obtain an injunction against the
issuer either for future violations of the law or for future sales of the

securities - an increasingly real possibility.
(ii) A more serious problem is posed by the civil liability provisions of

the 1933 Securities Act. In effect, the issuer may very well find himself
offering and selling a "put"; that is, a sale of a security coupled with a
guarantee that if the enterprise has a downturn and proves unsuccessful,
the issuer will be obligated to repurchase the security.

Section 12 of the 1933 Act sets forth the basic recission right

with regard to the sale of an unregistered security. Under s.12(1)
of the 1933 Act, any person who offers or sells a security without
making the required registration is liable to the purchaser for the
amount paid for the security, plus interest, less any income received from the security, or for damages if the purchaser no longer
owns the security. Liability is effectively absolute: the offeror's
only defenses are to show that the particular security or transaction was exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933
Act or that the purchaser at the time of purchase had actual
knowledge of the fact that the sale was in contravention of the law
(see Jennings & Marsh 1031). Any legal action based upon this
section must be instituted within one year after the violation
upon which it was based, and in no event more than three years
after the security was offered to the public (s.13 of 1933 Act).
In addition, the civil liabilities and broad anti-fraud provisions
of the 1933 Act apply to the sale of securities by means of any
communication that includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary to make the statements not misleading in the light of the circumstances under
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which they were made. In the event of a material misstatement
or omission, the purchaser has rescission rights against the seiler
regardless of whether the transaction was exempt from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act (s.12(2) of the 1933
Act). Moreover, criminal liabilities arise under federal law for
willful violations (s.24 of the 1933 Act).
1934 Act - Rule lob-5.
The most pervasive of the armory of anti-fraud devices under
federal securities laws is Rule 10b-5, as promulgated under s.1OB
of the 1034 Act. By definition, the Rule applies to a "purchase
or sale" of any security, regardless of registration or the existence
of an exemption.
During the 30 year period since a private cause of action was
first implied under s.1JB and Rule 10b-5, a substantial body
of case law and commentary has developed as to its elements,
much of which has generated uncertainty and ambiguity as to
actually how broad the scope of the Rule. This Rule has been
used as a weapon with respect to such matters as (i) misrepresentations and omissions involving a purchase or sale, (ii) corporate mismanagement, (iii) manipulation, (iv) tipping and inside
trading, (v) tender offers and exchange offers, (vi) activities of
brokers and other fiduciaries, (vii) freezeout of minoTity shareholders, and (viii) various other activities which may involve fraud
in a securities transaction. ' 0
Very recently, the Supreme Court appears to be implying that
the Rule is, however, not to be used as a broad catch-all for every
type of security or business abuse. 2 1 Nevertheless, the Rule still
remains a potent weapon in the hands of a party where there is
(i) conduct by the defendant prescribed by the Rule, (ii) an
actual purchase or sale of securities by the plaintiff in connection
with such prescribed conduct, (iii) some form of scienter or its
equivalent (i.e. reckless disregard) on the part of defendants and
(vi) resulting damages to the plaintiff (see generally Bromberg
and Jacobs, supra.)
(B)

20.
See SEC Release No. 34-3230 (May 21, 1942). This Rule provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or

instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mail, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice, to defraud,

2 to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceipt upon any person,
in connextion with the purchase or sale of any security."

E.g. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 732 (1975), which stressed
21.
a strict interpretation of the purchaser-seller requirement; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
96 S.Ct. 1375 (1976), which held that scienter (and not mere negligence) is an essential
element of a 10b-5 action; and Green v. Santa Fe (Sup. Ct. No. 75-1753, March 23,
1977), CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep., which limited to relief under state corporate laws "freezeout" of minority interest under short-form merger statute.

ANGLO-AMERICAN LA W RE VIEW
(C) Derivative Liability.
(1) Aiding and abetting. The notion of aiding and abetting
first found its way into federal securities laws in SEC disciplinary proceedings, and was based by way of analogy to criminal
cases. Aiding and abetting was subsequently recognized in 10b-5
private rights of actions, which relied mainly on tort theory
rather than prior securities precedents.
Generally, a person aids and abets another person in breaching the federal securitiy laws when he knows or should have
known that a violation is occurring and he renders substantial
assistance either by taking an affirmative action or by remaining
silent or inactive when he has a duty to speak or act. Aiding and
abetting would itself be a breach of Rule 1Ob-5.
As strongly noted by the Fitth Circuit in 1975 in Woodward
v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84:
"[B] efore someone can be caught within the net of aiding and abetting
liability under Rule 10b-5, another party must have violated the securi-

ties laws, the alleged aider-abetter must be generally aware of his role
in improper activity, and he must knowingly render substantial assistance."

Without these limitations, the Court felt the securities laws would
become a snare for guilty and innocent alike.
There still remains, however, substantial dispute as to whether,
or to what extent, silence or inaction can fulfill the requirements
as to knowing, substantial assistance of the violation. Essentially,
this issue turns on the nature of the duty owed by the alleged
aider and abetter to the other parties of the transaction. The
standards courts have used for measuring culpability by silence
have varied. Some have declared without qualification that silence
and inaction alone can create liability for aiding and abetting
[e.g., Brennan case, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir., 1969)]. Other courts
squarely reject the notion that inaction alone is enough, distinguishing the contrary authorities [e.g., Landry case, 486 F.2d
139 (3rd Cir. 1974)]. One court has suggested a rule imposing
liability "only where it is shown that the silence of the accused
aider and abetter was consciously intended to aid the securities
laws violation" [SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974)].
Another court has held that liability for silence or inaction arises
"only when a duty to disclose has arisen" [Strong case, 474
F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1973)].
(2) Liability of Controlling Persons. Section 30(a) of the
1934 Act predicateN the liability of "controlling" persons under
the Act:
"Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of [the 1934 Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent
as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
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is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the acts or acts constituting the violation
or course of action."

The difficulty with this Section is that no precision is given
to who constitutes a "control" individual. The determination
appears to be largely a factual one [see Klapmier case, 314 F.
Supp. 13b0 (D.Minn. 1970)].
Under the 1934 Act, characterization as a "controlling" person
may expose one to liability under (i) Rule lOb-5 if he engaged
in the purchase or sale of securities; (ii) s.18(a) of the 1934 Act
respecting filing of false or misleading public documents; or
(iii) s.16 of the 1934 Act respecting short-swing profits. Under
s.20(a) a "controlling" person may avail himself of the defence
(except with respect fo s.16, which imposes a strict liability)
that he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly
induce the act or acts" in question; although such person bears
the burden of proof [see Mader case, 461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.,
1972)1.
Being a controlling person also has significance under the
1933 Act in that he may have liabulity under ss.11 and 12 of
such Act. Moreover, a controlling person may trigger disclosure
respecting various documents under the 1933 and 1934 Act. A
controlling person is also significantly impeded in disposing of
his securities. '2
(3) Statutory Underwriter. The notion of a statutory underwriter for purposes of derivative liability essentially goes to the
validity of claiming an exemption from the formal registration
requirements of the 1933 Act. If a statutory underwriter is found
to exist in a given transaction, either of the frequently used
exemptions under s.4 of the Act (i.e., Section 4(2) private placements or s.4(1) regarding transactions by any person other than
an issuer, underwriter, or dealer) cannot be claimed. As such,
the concept of statutory underwriter operates effectively to
control non-registered distributions of securities.
For purposes of claiming a s.4(1) exemption, the term "underwriter" means "any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,
the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct
or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates
or has a participation direct or indirect in the underwriting of such
undertaking. . ." Moreover, solely for purposes of defining the
term "underwriter", the term "issuer" shall also include controlling persons. Thus a controlling person, even though he is not an
issuer, underwriter or dealer may not be able to sell under s.4
22.

See generally Sommer, "Who's 'In Control'?-SEC", in Selected Articles on Federal

Securities Law, 195 (A.B.A., 1968).
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(1) if a statutory underwriter is involved in the transaction [see
Chinese Benevolant Association case, 120 F.2d 739 (2nd Cir.,
1941)].
The crucial concept applied by the SEC in ascertaining the
presence of a statutory underwriter is that of a "distribution".
The SEC views those who participate directly or indirectly in
a distribution of securities (whether formal or informal) as possible statutory underwriters. The SEC's interpretation refers
to the distribution process as an integrated whole, and not to
any isolated purchase, offer or sale for an issuer [see In the Matter
of Ira Haupt & Co., 23 SEC 589 (1946)].
If in fact a statutory underwriter is involved, s.4(1) exemption
cannot be claimed. Moreover, if a person purchases from a controlling person in a private placement, but the facts indicate he
did so with a "view toward distribution", he becomes in fact a
statutory underwriter and loses his exemption along with that of
the controlling person. In 1972, the SEC Rules 144 and 237
for the purpose of clarifying the concept of "underwriter" and
facilitating the distribution of "restricted" (i.e., unregistered
or control) securities. 23
CONCLUSION
The development of United States securities laws remains
peculiar to the American experience. However, the substantive
and jurisdictional embrace of these laws has broad implications
for transnational business activities involving United States connecting factors. An appreciation of these implications is essential
for prudent business and legal decisions relating to such activities.

23.
See SEC Release No. 33-5223 (effective April 15, 1972) CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
para 78, 487, as subsequently amended on various occasions through June 8, 1976 (SEC
Release No. 33-517, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para 80, 601). The following is a guide to
use of Rule 144:

1. Offer or sale of restricted securities of a reporting company by any person (whether issuer, "control" or "non-control" person) - Rule 144 applicable.

2. Offer or sale of restricted or non-restricted securities of a nonreporting company
by a control person - Rules 144 & 237 not applicable - must seek private placement
exemption.
3. Offer or sale of non-restricted securities of a reporting company by a "control"

person - Rule 144 applicable (except for holding period).
4. Offer or sale of restricted securities by a non-control person - Rule 237 applicable.
5. Offer or sale of non-restricted securities by a non-control person - Rules 144 &

237 not applicable. Section 4(1) exemption available.
Note: Rule 144 is non-exclusive;but safe course is to use 144 whenever possible.

